Even if Russia Uses a Nuke, We Probably Won’t—but Putin Would Still Pay Dearly

If Russia were to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine it would, as CIA Director William Burns put it in public remarks last week, “change the world in a flash.” It might not, however, according to several experts, result in the direct military involvement of the west or a broader nuclear war.

That is not to say that such an attack would not produce devastating consequences beyond those related to the attack itself. There are a wide range of options that NATO would consider—many of which would produce lasting, disastrous consequences for Russia. Further, there is a clear sense among current and former U.S. government officials that Western leaders’ disinclination to take the bait and trigger a global war would and should be seen as a sign of strength. Finally, for all these reasons, such an act of Russian desperation is likely to be yet another huge miscalculation on the part of Vladimir Putin.

Although nuclear weapons have not been used since the American attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the late summer of 1945, concerns about their use are higher than they have been in decades. CIA Director Burns, in remarks at the Georgia Institute of Technology last Thursday, said, “Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership…none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” On Friday, Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy echoed this warning saying that the international community should be concerned about Russian use of nuclear or chemical weapons, saying, “We should… not be afraid but be ready.”

Senior U.S. officials with whom I spoke emphasized that Burns was not basing his comments on any new intelligence or other evidence that Russia was preparing to use nuclear weapons, but rather on a prudent analysis of Russia’s situation. They mentioned that Russian doctrine had a “lower threshold” for the use of nuclear weapons than other nations, but that it was “still pretty high.” According to that doctrine, there were two kinds of events that would warrant consideration of the use of nuclear weapons. One was if the Russian military was facing a massive defeat that threatened its ability to further defend its country. The other was if there was a direct threat to the regime in Moscow.

A U.S. official who is closely tracking these matters noted that top Russian officials have been explicit in pointing out that the threat from events in Ukraine was not “existential.” This is seen as a possible signal that nuclear use was yet to be warranted under the guidelines described above. He added, “Nothing we’ve seen suggests they’re at the precipice” of taking such action.

U.S. officials also emphasized that in such circumstances, it would be expected that the first use of a nuclear weapon would be as a “warning shot,” likely the detonation of a device in the upper atmosphere. Whether Russia chooses such an approach or another, however, U.S. officials are confident NATO has multiple options via which to inflict high costs on the Russians without “transgressing” as the Russians would have done.

Should Russia use nuclear weapons of any sort on NATO forces or territory, the result would, of course, be swift and severe. A conventional attack on such forces, for example, would trigger a direct confrontation that it is believed the Russians very much want to avoid.

NATO currently has more troops in regions bordering Ukraine than Russia has in Ukraine. NATO’s military is much better equipped and trained than Russia’s. Ukraine has administered many crushing defeats on the Russians. It is unlikely that Putin—even at the moment of his greatest arrogance or frustration—would willingly undertake a battle with a force so clearly superior to his. As one senior U.S. national security official put it to me, “A fight would not be close.”

General Wesley Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said with regard to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, “We don’t have any comparable weapons. If Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine forces, it’s just another weapon. We provide more assistance. If he uses it against a city, we still respond with more assistance. We would also bring against him more condemnation and sanctions. If he strikes a NATO country, then we have to respond militarily. But still without using a nuclear weapon. Only if there are a series of nuclear strikes would I recommend a nuclear response.”

Jon Wolfsthal, who served as senior director for arms control and non-proliferation on the Obama administration’s National Security Council said, “We should not say precisely what a response to nuke use should be, but make clear it…